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Introduction by Thomas Schwartz, Vanderbilt University
"Détente was born in Europe and realistically, never had meaning or consequence outside of
Europe.” I recently came across this quotation from former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and
it seemed a fitting way to begin this roundtable about Stephan Kieninger’s impressive and thoroughly
well researched book on what the author calls “dynamic détente” in Europe from 1964 to 1975. The
[1]
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reviewers are all extremely positive about Kieninger’s manuscript. This is a noteworthy achievement.
In fact, in my years as an academic and a historian, I think I can count on one hand the number of
times I have read book reviews written by authors of what might be considered ‘rival’ books but who
were overwhelmingly favorable toward their competitor. It is a tribute to Kieninger that his book
makes it into this select club. The reviewers find much to praise in the scale of Kieninger’s research,
his analysis of the issues, and the forceful argument he makes. They make clear that Kieninger’s book
is a significant contribution to both Cold War history and the history of the détente process in
Europe.
Luke Nichter, author of a book which examined the Nixon Administration and Europe, sees in
Kieninger’s approach a much more Eurocentric exploration of this period than the book he wrote. He
is particularly impressed with the degree to which Kieninger successfully examines complex and
detailed multilateral negotiations. The three he highlights are the MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions), negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe, the CSCE (Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe), the negotiations which led to the famous Helsinki agreements,
and the offset negotiations, those NATO discussions which sought to reduce or offset the costs of the
stationing of American forces in Europe. Nichter, who has probably spent more time listening to the
Nixon tapes than any human being should be required, acknowledges that President Richard Nixon
and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had very little interest in the ‘multilateral détente’
which Kieninger describes. His only significant criticism is that Kieninger does not recognize the
significance of domestic politics in how Nixon approached Europe. Nichter illustrates that by quoting
John Connally, a man who qualified as Europe’s least favorite American before Donald Trump came
along. The Texan Treasury Secretary warned about a united Europe as a ‘Frankenstein monster,’ his
words a reflection of the skepticism Nixon brought to European matters.
[2]

Werner Lippert’s earlier work explored the economic diplomacy which facilitated Willy Brandt’s
Ostpolitik, and his review suggests that Kieninger does not adequately explore the economics which
facilitated détente, especially trade. However, Lippert praises the book for its careful examination of
the “second-level” actors in the State Department and Foreign Ministry who pursued the policy of
dynamic detente over successive presidential administrations and changes in government. Lippert
also praises the degree to which the book promotes a “profoundly liberal” view of the value of
negotiation, diplomacy, and cooperation in resolving international conflict. Certainly this suggests the
value in taking from the historical experience of dynamic détente lessons in resolving current
historical standoffs, perhaps including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action otherwise known as
the Iranian nuclear deal. Along with its other qualities, Lippert is most impressed with the sheer
timeliness of Kieninger’s effort.
[3]

Kenneth Weisbrode identifies the two central contributions of Dynamic Detente as first, providing
greater precision to the history of détente, and second, providing a much deeper understanding of
the debates and discussions within American officialdom over the more than decade-long period in
which détente was pursued. The emphasis on continuity of policy across presidential administrations
earns Weisbrode’s praise, as it is often lost in the tendency of American historians to believe that
presidents set the foreign policies of their administrations without regard to what has occurred
before their presidencies. Weisbrode, whose first book provided a rich examination of the American
diplomats who forged a close connection to Europe over the course of the 20th century, suggests that
Kieninger’s concept of “dynamic détente” should be seen as a part of a broader euro-Atlantic vision,
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less a product of the Cold War and more “an aspirational component of international society.” One of
his few reservations about the book is that Kieninger does not pay enough attention to some of the
Helsinki review conferences, which served to keep public attention on the issues of compliance with
those accords. Weisbrode also raises the uncomfortable question of how many of the achievements of
“dynamic détente” now seem challenged, from the building of walls and restrictions on the ‘freer
movements’ of peoples to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which brutally violated the
concept of the inviolability of borders.
Weisbrode concludes his review by suggesting that those within the diplomatic bureaucracies who
made dynamic détente a reality should be recognized and honored. Having highlighted the role
played by Deputy National Security Adviser Francis Bator in promoting the policy of bridge building
under Lyndon Johnson, I strongly support Weisbrode’s suggestion.
[5]

Participants:
Stephan Kieninger is an independent historian and the author of Dynamic Détente: The United
States and Europe, 1964-1975 (Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series, Rowman and Littlefield,
2016). He received his Ph.D. from Mannheim University. He is currently finishing a book manuscript
on cooperative security policies and pan-European energy trade. In the academic year 2016/2017, he
was a Fellow at the Berlin Center for Cold War Studies. Formerly, he was a Senior Researcher at the
Federal German Archives. His research interests include Cold War diplomacy, Europe’s transnational
history, and international energy security and trade.
Thomas Alan Schwartz is a Professor of History and Political Science at Vanderbilt University. Most
recently, he is the co-editor with Matthias Schulz, The Strained Alliance: US-European Relations in
the 1970s (Cambridge University Press, 2009). He is currently working on a study of former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger entitled Henry Kissinger and the Dilemmas of American Power.
Werner Lippert, (Ph.D. Vanderbilt University, 2005) is an expert on contemporary transatlantic
history and United States foreign relations during the Cold War.
His major focus is on diplomatic, economic, and security aspects. In addition to working in these
areas of specialization, he participates in the department’s social studies education program by
teaching social studies education classes and supervising student teachers. His most recent
publication is The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik: Origins of NATO’s Energy Dilemma. (Berghahn,
2010).
Luke A. Nichter is an Associate Professor of History at Texas A&M University–Central Texas. His
books include Richard Nixon and Europe: The Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World (Cambridge
University Press, 2015), the New York Times bestseller The Nixon Tapes: 1971-1972 (Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), The Nixon Tapes: 1973 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015), and the
forthcoming Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. and the Decline of the Eastern Establishment (Yale University
Press).
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Kenneth Weisbrode teaches history at Bilkent University and is the author of The Year of
Indecision, 1946 (Viking, 2016).

Review by Werner Lippert, Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Akin to Mark Twain’s adage that “History doesn’t repeat itself- but it rhymes,” one could easily make
an argument that Russia’s current falling out with the United States is not necessarily a repeat of the
Cold War–but that this confrontation has many ‘rhyming’ elements of the international context of the
1960s and 1970s: a pervasive sense of economic stagnation, a reluctance to foster military escalation,
and a focus of the American electorate on domestic issues such as race and gender equality. All these
aspects left Western statesmen in the 1960s in limbo over how to approach the Soviet Union–a state
similar to the haphazard approach towards Russia today. In this sense, Stephan Kieninger’s new book
Dynamic Détente, which details differing approaches to détente with an economically flailing but
militarily tenacious Soviet Union is as timely as it is relevant.
The question of how to maintain a transatlantic alliance among countries (and statesmen) that
identified increasingly divergent foreign policy goals in the 1960s, a decade that saw the Cold War
division of Europe becoming more and more entrenched, is one that has vexed many politicians in the
past and continues to do so to this day. Hawkish or dovish approaches to opposing states seem to
replace each other with every new election and no consistent policy seems to emerge.
In contrast, Kieninger asserts that the American foreign policy establishment pursued a remarkably
consistent détente policy from President Dwight Eisenhower to President Gerald Ford, closely aligned
and mutually reinforced with the diplomatic core of Western European nations. These bridge-builders
on both sides of the Atlantic maintained a vision of a ‘whole and free’ Europe even when confronted
with realpolitik from a Nixon/Ford White House. It was these bridge-building strategies, implemented
by a loose web of government officials, which created the peaceful resolution to the Cold War,
precipitated through the free movement of goods and people within Europe. Institutionalizing this
economic and political understanding in the Helsinki Accords of 1975 represented the greatest
achievement of these bridge-builders and, ultimately, led to the gradual waning of Soviet dominance
in Eastern Europe.
In line with the work of such American historians as Kenneth Weisbrode and German historians like
Oliver Bange, Kieninger details the bridge-building contributions of diplomats like George Vest and
Arthur Hartman in the policy-making process on both sides of the Atlantic. As such, he beautifully
illustrates the inherently differing perspectives between elected officials with their need for instant
and far-reaching results as opposed to the government bureaucrats, willing to ride out the waves in
favor of a consistent, gradual shift in the right direction.
[6]

Kieninger’s deep and detailed analysis of such second-level transatlantic actors in the U.S. State
Department/West German Foreign Ministry helps to illuminate ideological beliefs on both sides of the
Atlantic. At that, Kieninger manages to transcend the previously pervasive historiographical context
of American détente, led by President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, vs.
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West Germany’s Ostpolitik. At the risk of perhaps over-emphasizing transatlantic unity, between
then-West-Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt and U.S. President John F. Kennedy, for example (306), the
question of what divided American and West German détente takes second stage to the awareness
that the transatlantic diplomatic interplay in a dynamic détente made the successful conclusion of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) possible. Such an analysis offers the
possibility of looking more realistically at what strategies actually worked in influencing the Soviet
Union: stripping away the state-centered narrative allows Kieninger to make a profoundly liberal case
for negotiations, diplomacy, and cooperation as the most effective means of overcoming international
divisions. In fact, Kieninger goes so far as to assert “the GDR [German Democratic Republic]
negotiated its own demise at the CSCE.” (289) It seems only natural that Kieninger’s most fascinating
contribution, then, lies in his analysis of the power dynamics surrounding the emergence and
consensus-building on the three baskets of the CSCE and the wavering superpower support in
concluding the process.
In highlighting the consistencies and success of the liberal bridge-building approach to the détente
process, Kieninger sometimes leaves the reader wanting a wider and perhaps more traditional
perspective on détente policies. In detailing the interactions between government bureaucracies and
elected leaders, it would have been helpful to touch on the reservations some German Foreign
Ministry officials had in engaging the Soviet Union to the extent the Brandt government and its
bridge-builders wished. It would have been interesting to learn if groups of such conservative
thinkers also engaged in bridge-building approaches of their own–and to what extent they were able
to influence transatlantic policy towards the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, approaching this work on transatlantic bridge-builders from a teleological perspective,
one wonders about the efficacy of the bridge-building process, in general. A better developed
causality between the diplomatic achievements of the CSCE and its ultimate effects in transforming
East European societies would have been instructive. Other components, such as economic prosperity
and trade, also played a key role in creating resentment among Eastern Europeans toward the
Communist regimes, but they find little attention in this work. Considering the prominence of
economics in the conservative argument that it was the West’s economic prowess that ultimately
broke the East bloc, the reader sometimes wished that Kieninger had cast his argument a bit wider.
After all, was it not at least in part economics that drove the U.S. and the Soviet Union to find some
resemblance of balance and reconciliation at in their détente strategies?
That said, Kieninger has provided an exciting narrative on the culture of transatlantic ties that were
kept alive by government bureaucrats at a time when elected officials seemingly parted ways on how
to deal with the Soviet Union. His well-documented research on the distinctions between and
similarities of American and European efforts at détente in the 1960s and 1970s offers unique
insights into networks and structures that make an alliance work, even in the absence of cooperative
leadership from elected officials. His work is not meant to offer a revisionist perspective on Cold War
history but to highlight the consistency of liberal foreign policy tropes in the context of dynamic
détente policies on both sides of the Atlantic. This, his book does exceedingly well and it certainly will
become a standard resource for any historian wishing to delve into the depths of international
alliance politics during détente.
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Review by Luke A. Nichter, Texas A&M University–Central Texas
William Stubbs, the Oxford don and specialist in the constitutional history of England, was known for
consulting medieval manuscripts in search of clues to explain the beginning of ‘modern’ history. In
particular, he examined very small changes in human behavior, over the longue durée, focusing on
kings, barons, and others. This work led him to one of his central conclusions that even though rulers
often have taken liberty away from the ruled, somehow liberty managed to survive. Stephan
Kieninger’s book, Dynamic Détente: The United States and Europe, 1964-1975, leaves a similar
impression about the survival of détente.
[8]

Kieninger argues that “the power of dynamic détente policies transformed Europe in the shadow of
the military status quo” (xviii). In addition, since most of the book deals with the Nixon years,
“Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did not subscribe to the ideas that were at the heart of the
transformation approach. But their static détente policy left the transformation approach room to
coexist” (xvii). In other words, to paraphrase Mark Twain, we learn that the report of détente’s death
was exaggerated. Even though the 37th President and his National Security Advisor ultimately acted
as détente’s executioners, as opposed to its earlier champions, nonetheless détente managed to
survive.
There is much about this book to like. One of the most useful aspects of Kieninger’s work is his
frequent and detailed discussion of the historiography throughout. But, for this reviewer, the most
impressive detail is the fact that the author so fluently deals with subjects that are highly
technical–Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR), the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)/the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
offset negotiations with West Germany, and many others. Those who have immersed themselves in
the declassified government records of these subjects know how complicated these negotiations
were. Kieninger not only had the courage to tackle them, but to present them with life for nonspecialists. That is no small accomplishment.
[9]

Why did ‘dynamic’ détente ultimately decline after being championed by Nixon and Kissinger early
on? They did pursue bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, which produced both the Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in May 1972. These efforts were
arguably the most significant bilateral achievements of the détente era, and arguments for continued
détente. But the focus of Kieninger’s work is multilateral détente, a process that was ultimately
commandeered by Europeans. We can take away several points from Kieninger’s analysis in terms of
why Nixon and Kissinger were not more engaged in this process. First, the concept of multilateral
détente was not central to the Nixon Doctrine. Instead, Nixon and Kissinger preferred bilateral
negotiations. Second, Nixon and Kissinger not only had mistrust when it came to Europeans, but
American public opinion polls at the time showed that mistreating Europeans could be good politics
in the run-up to the 1972 elections. Third, Nixon and Kissinger were hesitant to negotiate in
multilateral forums where they had no seat at the table, e.g. the European Community (EC), or just
one voice among many, OSCE or NATO. Finally, pursing multilateral détente was not consistent with
Nixon and Kissinger’s emphasis on secrecy, bilateral negotiations that they led largely by themselves,
and prioritizing improvements in relations with adversaries as opposed to allies. For all of these
reasons, the surprise is not that détente survived in spite of these barriers, but, as Kieninger shows,
because of them.
[10]
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In this reviewer’s judgment, the book’s oversights are more errors of omission rather than
commission. There are examples of early Nixon-Kissinger policies that contributed to multilateral
détente. But, the question is why did they not last? In some cases we know the answer and in some
cases we do not. For example, the appointment of Daniel Patrick Moynihan as Counselor to the
President for Urban Affairs gave advocates of multilateral détente direct access to the Oval Office.
Even after Moynihan returned to academic life after the first two years of the administration, in order
to preserve his tenure at Harvard–boy, what a reception he received!–Nixon continued to seek his
counsel. Moynihan was one of the few advisors, other than Director of the Office of Public Liaison
Charles Colson, who could keep Nixon on the telephone for longer than two minutes, and often fifteen
minutes, and even more if face-to-face. Moynihan was the only presidential advisor, the leader of the
‘liberal’ staff members, who had the stature to speak freely to Nixon on these issues. This is why
Nixon put him in charge of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), a NATO
committee that Nixon called for in his April 1969 speech in celebration of the alliance’s twentieth
anniversary.
The CCMS started meeting later that year, following formal approval by the North Atlantic Council in
November, with Moynihan as head of the U.S. representation. At the time, NATO Secretary General
Manlio Brosio stated, “The aims of the Committee were seen in the light of Article 2 in the Atlantic
Charter and its setting up as an expression of the notion that security depends as much on the vitality
of the societies united in the Alliance as on the strength of their armies.” Nixon’s call for the
establishment of the CCMS, a non-military focus of NATO that remained part of the alliance’s
permanent structure until 2006, was intended to mark a formal entrance of the alliance into the
détente era. As military cooperation expanded to include political cooperation, the environment and
social policy offered new realms for cooperation and partnership both among Western nations and
between the East and West. While Kieninger is correct that Nixon and Kissinger “did not subscribe
to the ideas that were at the heart of the transformation approach,” examples like the appointment of
Moynihan and the creation of the CCMS reflect something more than a Nixon and Kissinger ‘static’
approach to détente (xvii). For this reviewer, the real question is why this early momentum was lost,
but perhaps that is simply explained by the demise of advisors like Moynihan and the retrenchment of
the ‘conservative’ advisors, led by Counselor to the President Arthur Burns. Following Moynihan’s
departure, it is clear that these polices lost their champion and Oval Office lobbyist.
[11]

[12]

[13]

The author’s fluent engagement with the historiography through the book, which is truly one of the
volume’s best features, is uneven at times. He may rely too much on the work of Stephen Ambrose.
Certainly Ambrose’s work on Nixon holds up better than his work on Eisenhower. Missing from the
text are Melvin Small’s fine work on the Nixon historiography, Richard Moss’s work on détente,
linkage, and the backchannels (though his dissertation is cited in chapter 4), and some newer works
are included in the bibliography but apparently not engaged in the text, e.g. Daniel Sargent’s recent
book. Also, the book does not appear to substantively address the relationship between domestic
politics and détente. For example, Secretary of the Treasury John Connally is never mentioned in the
book, yet was arguably the Nixon advisor who was most resistant to the ideas of détente and
multilateral negotiations. While there are many examples of the tough-talking Texan on the Nixon
tapes, the best example is summed up here:
[14]

Nixon: “I have come completely around to the view that Connally so eloquently
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expressed a year ago and which we rejected for what then appeared to be good reasons.
The way the Europeans are talking today, European unity will not be in our interest,
certainly not from a political viewpoint or from an economic viewpoint…What matters
now is what we do and we must act effectively and soon or we will create in Europe, a
Frankenstein monster, which could prove to be highly detrimental to our interests in the
years ahead.”
[15]

The influence of domestic political concerns, and the upcoming presidential election, must be
considered when determining why, as Kieninger concludes, Nixon and Kissinger “did not subscribe to
the ideas that were at the heart of the transformation approach.” (xvii) This is true for any national
political leader, but especially so for one who left scholars 3,451 hours of secret recordings, many of
which are still unpublished and which contain numerous insights into Nixon and Kissinger’s thinking
on détente.
The publication of Stephan Kieninger’s Dynamic Détente: The United States and Europe, 1964-1975
fills a critical void in our understanding of détente’s rise, fall, and survival, and U.S.-European
relations more generally. He shows that while Nixon and Kissinger were eager to throw away détente
when it no longer had a domestic political purpose, it was Europeans who acted as keepers of the
flame. Kieninger’s mastery of a technical set of subjects, and his lucid presentation of them for a
more general audience, mean that transatlantic relations during the 1970s have come more into
focus than ever before. Thankfully, Kieninger’s work is a far better guide to explaining détente’s
survival than were Stubbs’s medieval manuscripts.

Review by Kenneth Weisbrode, Bilkent University
Stephan Kieninger’s study of détente joins the growing literature on the period that culminated in the
1975 Helsinki Final Act and its subsequent review conferences. This literature includes a number of
familiar works as well as edited volumes. Kieninger’s book makes two significant contributions: it
extends and gives greater precision to the history of this policy in the United States; and it deepens
an understanding of American officialdom by tracing how extensively this policy was debated,
promoted, and resisted within the U.S. government. Of these contributions, it is the second one in
particular that is unsurpassed in the historical literature on détente.
[16]

[17]

A glance at Kieninger’s book might suggest a traditional diplomatic history. It is more than that. In
showing that “dynamic détente” (a term borrowed from Jacques Andréani, the French diplomat)
extended from the early 1950s into the 1970s, Kieninger challenges the standard periodization of the
Cold War, or at least the American side of it, with regard to Europe. This periodization is a legacy of
John Lewis Gaddis’ Strategies of Containment, which paired successive American administrations
with approaches to containment, and relayed the latter as a theme with variations, each in
contradistinction to its predecessors and at times appearing divorced from whatever else may have
been happening around the world. “Dynamic détente,” however, was crafted in league with other
governments, and was arguably more consonant and conversant with their actual aims and interests.
It also outlasted the efforts of some Americans to bury or reinvent it. From the Eisenhower
[18]
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administration to the Ford administration, every president came around to seeing the value of the
policy; and, although all may not have backed it with the passion of the converted, they nevertheless
continued to advance it.
This was true for no one more than President Richard Nixon, whose administration dominates
Kieninger’s book. Kieninger reminds us how important and controversial Europe was to U.S. foreign
policy during the 1970s when so much of public attention was directed elsewhere. He demonstrates
convincingly that Nixon and his celebrated aide, Henry Kissinger, were not only misguided about
‘détente’—their signature policy—but also outmaneuvered by the proponents of a different type of
détente—dynamic détente—within their own administration.
How and why did it happen?
The book offers three answers. First, the Nixon-Kissinger version of détente, which Kieninger calls
“static” (86 et seq.) but which resembled more an entente or condominium with the Soviet Union,
may have made some sense for parts of Asia and other areas of the world, but was poorly suited to a
liberalizing Europe, especially Western Europe, in the early 1970s. Second, dynamic détente, which
had been bolstered by the “bridge building” and “peaceful engagement” initiatives of the Johnson
administration, had by now acquired a committed and well-placed group of adherents on both sides of
the Atlantic who were determined to see it succeed. Third, these adherents, by their skillful and
persistent mastery of institutions, networks, and negotiations, manipulated their political bosses into
carrying out this policy.
Kieninger gives a useful corrective, and not only from an American point of view. It suggests, for
example, that future historians may ask less often how wise or wicked Henry Kissinger was, and
instead how much he really mattered, at least in this case. In Kieninger’s account, Kissinger appears
less an Otto von Bismarck or a Klemens von Metternich than a Friedrich von Gentz—something that
would come as little surprise to the officials who worked most closely with Kissinger during this
period and to whom he dedicated his best-selling primer, Diplomacy. Not all were so critical of
him—indeed, some admired him—but many also tended to dismiss him as an academician or theorist.
Many, too, were quite happy to have Kissinger there, for in addition to the attention he drew to
himself and to his desire to promote the diplomatic arts, he was sufficiently abstract-minded to allow
space for the professionals to get on with their jobs, that is, what they saw as their craft. Kissinger
depicted this bias the other way around, and was happy to give bureaucrats ‘busy work’ to do while
he got on with statecraft. The real story is more complex: each made use of the other as various
‘backchannels’ alternately provoked and cancelled out one another’s influence on policy, or at least
multiplied the potential costs and benefits of cooptation within the bureaucracy. In spite of copious
references to works that feature Kissinger front and center, Kieninger’s book is written from a
bureaucratic—specifically the State Department’s—perspective.
[19]

[20]

At this point I must disclose a bias: one of the bureaucrats whose work Kieninger describes at length
is the foreign service officer, James Goodby, with whom I have collaborated on a number of articles. I
have been influenced strongly by his thinking and by his rendition of the negotiations leading up to
the Helsinki Final Act, in which he and his colleagues at the U.S. NATO mission played a significant
role at nearly every stage. Thus my view at times goes against that of some of the standard literature
on Helsinki and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), best summarized in
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Sarah Snyder’s monograph, which, despite her diligent use of U.S. sources, asserts, “… the United
States was less focused on developing the form and substance of the conference, and the European
allies ultimately led the efforts to protect Western interests in the conference preparations.” Snyder
has singled out Goodby’s account as one that “may overemphasize the influence of American
diplomats on Western European CSCE policy.” Kieninger reports the views of allies for the most
part directly from their own sources, yet his account is more consistent with Goodby’s (194-98).
[21]

Ascribing credit here matters because, according to Kieninger, dynamic détente in the United States
succeeded insofar as it was sustained in the main not from above but from below. He has written that
some of the people behind this effort were opportunists, citing a footnote in my book Atlantic
Century where I make the distinction between opportunism and the approach he had previously
described elsewhere and which he extends here: a contending strategy of détente. This may well be
a distinction without difference, because Kieninger’s use of the term opportunism, like my own, does
not refer to bureaucratic advantage per se, but to the opportunities taken from within the
bureaucracy for broader goals that may or may not be termed strategic. Yet there remains in
Kieninger’s study some ambiguity, perhaps even some confusion, between policy, however deliberate,
and broader strategy. This depiction, again, of the Cold War is seen in the work of Gaddis and others,
like that of Gaddis’s pupil, Jeremi Suri, who has written specifically on Kieninger’s period. Their
variations are labeled strategies, and these strategies, in turn, presumably determined operational
and tactical policies. But then what was ‘containment’? Gaddis has called it a ‘grand strategy’ but to
many people, especially those working in government, containment was simply a policy or at most a
doctrine. This, too, may have been their understanding of dynamic détente.
[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

Bureaucrats are not usually known for their mastery of ‘grand strategy.’ They implement policies.
They also design and shape those policies by advising leaders, crafting messages, and managing
initiatives. Their opportunism, to the extent that they are conscious of it, is ideally in the service of a
policy for which there is already a political consensus in place and which has, in their judgment, some
likelihood of success. The promotion of ‘freer movement’ in the CSCE negotiations was one such
policy. It arose in response to a Soviet initiative (the Budapest Appeal of March 1969) and a set of
proposals—in other words, as a concession to demand by reciprocity. It now may appear to have been
a rather masterful means to cause strain and ultimately crisis across the Soviet bloc, and even in the
Soviet Union itself. But the evidence for such mastery, though suggested at times, even by some of
Kieninger’s bureaucratic actors, is not causally definitive. If the policy had been understood and
made explicit in this way, it would have recalled the dogma of “rollback,” which was rejected as far
back as 1953 by supporters of dynamic détente, including President Dwight Eisenhower (5-11; cf. 274
n.113). It was also the reason that Francis Bator, the main author of Lyndon Johnson’s October 1966
speech (49-54) was so livid that Zbigniew Brzezinski, then working in the bowels of the State
Department, took credit for writing the speech after having contributed only a couple of lines; when
word of this got out, Soviet propagandists were able to denounce it as a devious bit of
rollback—precisely the thing for which Brzezinski was then and later much better known.
The early U.S. embrace of freer movement, and of the CSCE itself, may well suggest that the Cold
War was brought to an end through the deployment of dynamic détente. I would not disagree on
principle. But for me it goes too far to say that this was the result of a clever strategy on the part of
one or more of the Western governments. For that would only play into the idea that one side clearly
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won the Cold War and another clearly lost it, or even, that it ended peacefully after one side forfeited
and liquidated itself under pressure. This may all be true, or may be seen to be true, as more
evidence comes to light. But at the time of writing, the Cold War—its prolongation and/or its end—is
not the whole story, or even the central theme, of this book.
Rather, dynamic détente was a means to a related, perhaps higher, end: peace in Europe, and by
extension, peace between America and Europe. This was an end that predated the Cold War and was
once hoped to transcend it. It was important not only for Europeans who saw it as a necessary step
for moving beyond the logic of perpetual warfare, but also for Americans, who perceived it as a
means toward the redefinition of their country’s world role and reputation—a redefinition which
would not take place mainly by a destiny to fulfill in Asia, as some had said during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries (and as some still do today), but instead by joining with Europeans to supersede
what had been a long series of rivalries that extended from Europe to the rest of the world. Instead,
they would assert in progressive collaboration what came to be called Western power and, with that,
the development of Western leadership based on multilateral institutions and norms, alongside
growing economic interdependence, within and beyond the West.
Over time, this version of the West came to be called Euro-Atlantic, and was portrayed less as a
product or protagonist of the Cold War than as an aspirational component of international society.
Note here how some of Kieninger’s characters—the public servants Arthur Hartman and Henry
Owen, for example—had long been close to the reputed father of the European movement, Jean
Monnet, and were fervent proponents of Monnet’s integrationist approach to regional peace. The
CSCE, then, suggested such a harmonization of interests and worldviews: the agreement by all the
members of the Euro-Atlantic region upon a single map and a single set of standards that could, in
theory, lead to their forming a single peaceful and prosperous community. To the extent that there
was one, this was the strategic aim, not mobilizing civil society to tear apart the Soviet Empire,
however much some people on both sides of the Iron Curtain may have suspected a more devious
rationale at play.
There were some important side effects to dynamic détente. During the CSCE negotiations, for
example, the member-states of the European Community came to develop and promote a common
external role. Dynamic détente also succeeded in making formal an interdependence between ‘hard’
subjects—military arsenals and deployments—and ‘soft’ political, cultural, and social integration, as
the Helsinki Final Act had stipulated. Interdependence thus extended to the four diplomatic
components of détente in Europe: the Berlin Quadripartite negotiations, CSCE, the two Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaties [SALT], and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks [MBFR] (84,
86-87). These were indeed interrelated but their manner of interrelation was the opposite to the one
Nixon and Kissinger (and, arguably, their Soviet counterparts) had intended by the use of ‘linkage’;
the latter two negotiations became conditioned by—and arguably in the case of the first, dependent
upon—the former two, but not the other way around. As interrelatedness gave way to
interdependence, the four came to resemble a policy counterpart to the West German politician Egon
Bahr’s well-known slogan, Wandel durch Annäherung, change through rapprochement. Kissinger
himself liked to speak this way, referring, usually in retrospect, to pieces or elements of a policy
converging. He would present it not as a theme with variations but rather as a coda superimposed
upon the main body of a composition. That convergences or conjunctions were later shown to have
been more fortunate than intended, or even to have been inadvertent, as Daniel Sargent’s book
[26]

[27]

[28]
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illustrates on several subjects, need not mean that Nixon and Kissinger were any less strategicminded or even brilliant; merely that their preferred strategies were not well aligned with actual
policies, at least initially.
In the case of the CSCE, this resulted in a complicated—and, at least to historians, practically
undetectable—game of signaling whereby the Nixon administration and their Soviet interlocutors
would set out with one set of priorities, and some West Europeans, taking a cue from the quiet
encouragement of American bureaucrats, would set out with another, politicians then would protest
the confusion, and the caravan would move on. Kieninger has summarized this process well:
Time and again, the West Europeans resisted Nixon’s and Kissinger’s efforts to tone
down the substance of NATO’s CSCE agenda. The intransigence of the West Europeans
gave the bridge builders the cover to continue their policy…. Kissinger could not bring
his European partners to trim their ambitious objectives to the CSCE. Therefore, the
Soviets were not prepared to deliver concessions in MBFR. In the autumn of 1974,
Kissinger’s status quo détente was stuck: SALT was stalemated, MBFR was deadlocked,
and the prospects for the expansion of U.S. trade with the Soviet Union were gloomy…
Eventually, Kissinger came to support the dynamic détente that he had almost been
killing during the previous years. The Bureau of European Affairs gained more leverage.
Finally, Kissinger followed the advice of the bridge builders in his own department
(313).
Snyder also has partly acknowledged this point: “Although the United States was less involved in the
planning than its allies, its position was of particular importance given attempts to maintain harmony
within the Atlantic Alliance.” Kieninger has shown exactly how this worked, or ‘functioned,’ as
bureaucrats, especially Monnet-inspired ones, like to say.
[29]

In addition to this, there was the extension of the continuous mode of diplomacy to civil society
through the Helsinki review conferences and watch groups. My only criticism of Kieninger’s book is
that it appears to take Kissinger’s side here in dismissing the value of these efforts and the authority
of the U.S. Helsinki Commission (294-295). The work of the Commission gave both concrete support
and an important morale boost to those involved in the implementation of the Final Act, which
Kieninger later concedes in a footnote (303n133). Morale boosts mattered to Helsinki Watch Groups
in the U.S. and elsewhere, and Snyder’s and Sargent’s books show this particuarly well. It was
understandable that Kissinger would treat this sort of interference as a scolding exercise unworthy of
his attention, even as it sells short the work of Millicent Fenwick, Dante Fascell, and the other
members of the Commission and its staff who kept public attention focused on the humanitarian
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, namely freer movement.
At Helsinki, President Gerald Ford made the noble statement: “History will judge this Conference not
by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow—not by the promises we make, but by the
promises we keep.” The tenor of his statement may be what Kieninger means by his emphasis on
dynamic détente’s ‘durability.’ To historians, the point is related to policy continuity, which can be
overlooked by so much emphasis on change, transformation, and other ruptures in most histories of
[30]
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this period. With dynamic détente, it was a case of transformation by continuity, as the adjective
‘dynamic’ suggests. Kieninger’s detailed reconstruction of East-West diplomacy, especially that
involving Americans and Germans, demonstrates that durability as well as continuity succeeded
through the tenacity of its advocates, by the pragmatism and even the opportunism of those at the
highest levels of government, and, finally, by the aptness of the policy’s central axiom, combining
security with freedom, to the European reality of the 1970s.
So neat a conclusion risks sounding self-fulfilling. Was this really the case? An answer to that
question may come down to whether one endorses the view, following Suri, that détente was
designed to oversee a necessary and salutary period of international stability, or whether détente
understood as Ostpolitik—a loosening of tensions amid changes in the condition that brought them
about—could result in greater progress. Kieninger ultimately uses an optimal tool here to square the
circle between security and freedom, and between static and dynamic détente: the former made
possible the latter, the latter underwrote acceptance of the former, and it was probably all for the
best. He may be correct, but one cannot support that conclusion fully without a parallel history of the
1980s. There was then another fortunate historical convergence—between a fervent proponent of
both formulae, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and a fervent opponent, President Ronald
Reagan: “I don’t want a tête-à-tête—the next thing will be détente!” Had Reagan and Gorbachev not
come along and done all that they did to end the Cold War, would dynamic détente today be seen in a
different light? Probably. History, as we know, does not neatly pose one set of aims against all others,
nor does it allow for the reconstruction of motivation as fact. Historians will continue to argue over
such things, as well they should, as more distance is put between the time of argument and the late
twentieth century. For now there is still no consensus on how or why the Cold War ended so
peacefully, just as there were and remain multiple definitions of the ‘West.’
[31]

On the subject of less fortunate conjunctions, it is worth noting a rather different reality today.
Although there is in place a successor to the SALT treaties, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty is no longer being fully enforced, nor is the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the
successor to the MBFR. The Helsinki Final Act has been violated many times, most blatantly and
brutally in Ukraine. There are walls going up across Europe, and freer movement seems every day
more like a relic of another era. Have the principles and norms that made détente dynamic just
stalled, or have they begun to recede? Future historians will almost certainly argue over when and
why Europe again became a breeding ground of geopolitical and ideological rivalry. One place they
could look for answers, following Kieninger, is among the attitudes and influence of particular actors
at the middle level of bureaucracies.
[32]

Not everyone will be content with so modest an emphasis. Many pages, for instance, continue to be
written by and about Henry Kissinger; yet on the CSCE, which must rate alongside the formidable
work in Asia as an important diplomatic victory of Kissinger’s tenure but for a continent he
considered partly his home turf, he was often wrong, dismissive, short-sighted, over-confident, and
self-defeating, until his belated conversion. By contrast, it has taken many decades for the public
servants one meets in Kieninger’s pages—Stan Resor, Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin, Marty
Hillenbrand, George Vest, Jacques Andréani, Jock Dean, Crispin Tickell, Francis Bator, and many
others—to receive serious historical attention. They were usually right. Will their successors someday
be so recognized?
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Author’s Response by Stephan Kieninger, Independent Historian
I should like to begin by thanking Tom Maddux of H-Diplo for setting up and preparing the
roundtable and the three reviewers for the insightful commentary on my book. I am glad that Thomas
Schwartz agreed to write the introduction, and I am delighted to receive feedback from Kenneth
Weisbrode, Werner Lippert, and Luke Nichter, particularly as it is so positive. I greatly appreciate
their constructive reviews and the opportunity to reflect on their comments.
My basic aim in writing the book was to shed new light on the interdependence between power and
mission in U.S. foreign policy, and my main argument is that dynamic détente policies made it
possible to square the circle and to foster both security and liberalizing changes. Détente did not
freeze the division of Europe: The power of dynamic détente policies transformed Europe in the
shadow of the military status quo. Moreover, I argue that the transformative effects of the Helsinki
Final Act were clearly intended by the proponents of dynamic détente policies. Kenneth Weisbrode
touches a particularly important point with regards to the existence of a coordinated Western
transformation scheme pertaining to the provisions on the freer movement of people, information,
and ideas under Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act. Weisbrode writes that this “would play into the
idea that one side clearly won the Cold War and another clearly lost, or even, that it ended peacefully
after one side forfeited and liquidated itself under pressure”. I believe that dynamic détente was
conceived as a win-win situation: Policymakers in the U.S. Department of State and in Western
Europe envisaged the stability enabled by détente as a precondition for change, as Communist
regimes saw a sense of security as a prerequisite for opening up their societies to Western influence
over time. Change needed time and international order. Thus, President Lyndon Johnson conceived
arms control, trade, and non-proliferation as gate openers for détente entailing crucial benefits for
the Soviet Union. Moreover, as Weisbrode notes, the masterminds of Lyndon Johnson’s peaceful
engagement were keen to camouflage the potentially subversive aspects of their policies. As
Weisbrode puts it: “If the policy had been understood and made explicit this way, it would have
recalled the dogma of ‘rollback’.”
[33]

All three reviewers comment on the compatibility between static and dynamic détente policies
emphasizing that President Richard Nixon’s and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s static approach
left the transformation strategy room to co-exist. Both Nixon and the bridge builders needed the
stabilization of East-West relations. In Nixon’s and Kissinger’s balance of power policy, stability was
essential to cement the allegedly endangered status quo in Europe. The bridge builders were more
self-confident in their aims: They envisaged stability in international relations as a precondition to
perforate the Iron Curtain and to multiply contacts, communication, and cooperation on all societal
levels. I am glad that all three reviewers provided in depth-comments on the evolution of dynamic
détente policies and their relevance for the negotiations on the road to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975
and beyond.
Another aim of my book was to shed new light on the interconnection between hard and soft factors.
Thus, I looked into several dimensions of détente. Arms control had crucial relevance for the flaws of
military détente. Technical aspects such as the invention of hydra-headed Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles had bold political ramifications for the overall process. It’s encouraging that the reviewers
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appreciated the technical aspects of my book. It was worth the trouble to write it and to inquire into
these issues. One of my major conclusion pertains to the lack of a meaningful military détente during
the 1970s – it only emerged in the mid-1980s. Why then did détente survive, how could it be
protected from the global Cold War, and why did it blossom again during the Ronald Reagan/Mikhail
Gorbachev years? Currently, I’m finishing a book manuscript trying to offer some new explanations
arguing that the crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations was compensated by policy initiatives from small- and
medium-sized European countries. The expansion of pan-European trade and the multiple
dimensions of the Helsinki process were key factors for the longevity of cooperative security policies.
My research ties with Oliver Bange’s and Poul Villaume’s book on the “Long Détente” and their
findings on the roots, relevance and persistence of détente in Europe. These questions will also be
addressed in two forthcoming volumes by Sarah Snyder/Nicolas Badalassi and Jussi
Hanhimäki/Barbara Zanchetta/Bernhard Blumenau.
[34]

[35]

[36]

All the reviewers elaborated on the limits of détente. After all, détente did not remove the
fundamental dissent over values, ideology and the global order. Détente was limited to the
emergence of cooperative security policies in Europe and its transatlantic and Eurasian frameworks.
The U.S. objective was to enmesh the Soviet Union in a matrix of relations with the West that would
restrain the further extension its global influence. The Soviet leadership rejected the idea of restraint.
Détente brought the Soviet Union nuclear parity and the recognition of equality as the legitimate
second global power. The Soviet leaders saw peaceful coexistence as a means to accelerate the
revolutionary class struggle and the global Cold War. Actually, the limits of détente were an integral
part of its concept. As Gottfried Niedhart put it: “The controversy over détente was essentially about
the meaning of détente”. The differing interpretations of the Helsinki Final Act underlined the
problem that the leaders in Washington and Moscow understood détente in entirely different ways.
The Soviet Union and its allies highlighted its static elements – the inviolability of frontiers and the
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. The West focused on Helsinki’s
dynamic potential insisting on the human rights and human contacts provisions as well as on the
possibility of a peaceful changes of frontiers.
[37]

Last but not least, I would like to address Werner Lippert’s important point that “it would have been
interesting to learn if groups of […] conservative thinkers [in Germany] also engaged in bridgebuilding approaches of their own – and to what extent they were able to influence transatlantic policy
towards the Soviet Union”. First of all, during the Grand Coalition Government, particularly
Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and his foreign policy adviser Günter Diehl made decisive
contributions to the emergence of the blueprint for Ostpolitik. Diehl was Director of the Policy
Planning Staff at the Foreign Office, and the brain-storming sessions at the trilateral planning
meetings between the U.S., British and German planners were key for the evolution of the
transformation strategy behind Ostpolitik. It was a fascinating experience for me to use the rich
papers of the State Department’ Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. National Archives and to investigate
the birth-pangs of dynamic détente policies as well as the transatlantic transfer of ideas behind it (see
chapters two and three in the book). In response to Chancellor Willy Brandt’s détente policy, the
German conservatives adopted a course of all-out opposition against the Ostpolitik of the
Brandt/Scheel Administration. In 1975, there were only three parties in Europe rejecting the Helsinki
Final Act: The Communist Party of Albania and the German Conservatives of Christian Democratic
Union of Germany (CDU) and Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU). Conservative opposition to
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Ostpolitik only began to wane over time. CDU Chairman Helmut Kohl represented the party’s
progressive wing, and he had his adviser Walther Leisler Kiep establish secret talks with East
German authorities. In 1978, even Bavaria’s Governor Franz Josef Strauß sent confidential signals to
the East German leadership signaling his willingness to accept the premises of Ostpolitik and to
continue the policy once CDU and CSU would be in government again. His key role in the billiondollar loan for the East German regime in 1983 underpinned his readiness to continue the policy he
had been criticizing for many years.
[38]

In the second half of the 1970s, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt advised Soviet Secretary General Leonid
Brezhnev to meet the leaders of CDU and CSU as well. Schmidt’s rationale was to portray Brezhnev’s
meeting with Kohl and Strauß as a way to take the emotional steam out of Ostpolitik. The first
meeting between Strauß and Brezhnev emerged on the occasion of the Schmidt-Brezhnev summit in
May 1978. Sitting next to Schmidt on the car ride to the Federal Republic’s guest house in Gynmich
Castle, Brezhnev confessed that he did not feel like he wanted to see Strauß: “What can I tell him?”,
Brezhnev asked. Schmidt’s response was that Brezhnev should better see Strauß: The meeting was
planned, and its cancellation would imply “considerable discord” as Schmidt put it. Schmidt’s advice
was: “Tell him the same things you told me. But do it in a shorter way on account of the fact there
was less time for the talks”.
[39]
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